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The settlement of the external debt of insolvent sovereign borrowers has
become one of the most important issues in relations between the north and
south since the outbreak of the global debt crisis in the early 1980s. For the
past eight years representatives of governments and international organiza-
tions, bankers, and scientists have suggested several proposals and plans to
solve the present debt crisis. The most prominent schemes in this respect are
the Baker Plan of 1985, which suggested massive new credits for the most
highly indebted developing countries, and the recently adopted Brady Plan,
which proposes partial debt discounts and reductions in interest rates. Both of
these debt settlement proposals were initiated by the United States and are
supported by the other principal creditor countries. However, despite the ten
years of crisis management, world leaders have not yet agreed upon a long-
term solution to the current debt problems. In the history of the capitalist
world economy, the current problems of coping with a global debt crisis do
not represent a unique event. Rather, recent empirical studies demonstrate that
sovereign borrowers have experienced many instances of debt-servicing diffi-
culties during the past 150 years (Eichengreen and Portes 1986; White 1986;
Eichengreen and Lindert 1989; Marichal 1989; Suter 1989).
In fact, together with the present global debt crisis, four periods of wide-
spread debt-servicing incapacity affecting mainly peripheral or less-developed
countries can be discerned since 1800: from the late 1820s to the early 1840s,
from the mid-1870s to the early 1880s, from the early 1930s to the late 1940s,
and since the early 1980s. During these periods of crisis the number of
countries with debt problems amounted to fifteen (late 1820s), seventeen
(mid-1870s), twenty-five (early 1930s), and thirty-three (1984). Indeed, the
proportion of all the sovereign nation states confronted with debt-servicing
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incapacity amounted to 30 percent in the late 1820s, 37 percent in the
mid-1870s, 40 percent in the early 1930s, and 27 percent in 1984 (Suter
1990:306-10).
However, despite those obvious similarities one important difference exists
between the present and earlier debt crises: Before World War II, debt crises
manifested themselves in outright defaults on foreign governmental bonds,
whereas from the 1950s onward defaults have been forestalled by the arrange-
ment of multilateral debt rescheduling agreements. Yet, because the current
debt crisis is still far from settled, it would be risky to conclude that the
rescheduling strategy is superior to the default strategy previously used.
Against the background of this historical evidence one may rather ask exactly
how earlier debt crises were finally settled and what can be learned from those
experiences for a better understanding of, and an improved coping with, the
present difficulties.
A large body of literature explores the historical dimension of debt crises
and their solution. These studies examine the long-run experiences of one or a
small number of debtor countries on the one hand (see, for example, Landes
1958; Bazant 1968; Thobie 1980; Scheetz 1986; Pamuk 1987; Aggarwal
1989; Cardoso and Dornbusch 1989), as well as the government and private
creditor response to debt problems on the other (for example, Kindleberger
1978; Fishlow 1986; Stallings 1987; Lipson 1985, 1989). In addition, debt
settlements of specific crises have been studied in some depth (for example,
Eichengreen and Portes 1986, 1989; Fishlow 1989). The single most impor-
tant empirical contribution on debt crises and debt settlements, Marichal's
recent study (1989), characterizes them as loan cycles—recurrent stages of
loan boom and debt crisis. Yet this analysis is limited in space and time
because it is confined to Latin American countries between 1823-1930.'
Thus, one has to conclude that there is a lack of studies which examine the
above-mentioned crises simultaneously on the aggregate level of the whole
world economy. Hence, this analysis attempts to describe and to explain the
pattern of debt settlement by comparing the present debt crisis with the three
previous principal crises using selected quantitative indicators covering vir-
tually all the cases of settled defaults and agreed reschedulings from 1820 to
1986.
This comparison is done on the basis of four principal dimensions. The first
and basic dimension relates to the actor structure underlying the financial
relations between creditors and debtor countries and the resulting institutional
framework associated with the debt settlement processes. An important ele-
1
 Marichal's (1989) study does not deal within its spatial and temporal limits with all cases of
default and debt settlement. Thus, although the Argentine default of 1891 is described in detail,
the defaults of Uruguay (1891), Santo Domingo (1892, 1897, 1899), Venezuela (1892, 1898),
Guatemala (1894, 1898), Ecuador (1894), Costa Rica (1895), and El Salvador (1897) were not
mentioned.
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ment with respect to the actor structure refers to the strength of cooperative
arrangements among creditors. The other three dimensions deal with the
pattern of debt settlements. The second dimension refers to the efficacy of the
crisis management, the third dimension to the degree of economic and politi-
cal influence exerted on debtor countries by creditors, and the fourth dimen-
sion to the terms of the debt settlement, that is, to the degree of debt relief
granted by creditors.
Our basic hypothesis suggests that the three dimensions referring to the
pattern of debt settlement—the efficacy of the crisis management, the degree
of creditors' influence, and the extent of debt relief—are determined by the
actor structure or, more specifically, by the actor structure on the creditors'
side. Thus, we argue that quick and efficient crisis management, the ca-
pability of creditors to exert far-reaching influence on debtor countries and to
enforce hard terms of debt settlements against the interests of debtor coun-
tries, depends upon the establishment of strong cooperative networks among
creditors. The institutionalization of such creditor clubs on their part presup-
poses that a relatively few actors dominate a dense interaction structure (see
Buckley 1967; Voss 1985:203; Pfister and Suter 1987).
Prior to World War II these conditions were not met. Until the debt crisis of
the 1930s the principal financial instrument of official external borrowing was
the foreign governmental bond, which was generally held by a large number
of individual bondholders. In 1914, for example, liabilities of tsarist Russia
vis-a-vis France amounting to $11 billion were owed to 1.6 million bond-
holders (Feis 1930:xii). In the post-war period, foreign bonds have been
replaced by loans and credits granted by official bodies of creditor countries
(such as development assistance agencies), international organizations (such
as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), and private commer-
cial banks. Development credits (extended either bilaterally by highly devel-
oped core countries or multilaterally by international organizations), private
and official export creditors, and syndicated credits offered by commercial
banks and stabilization loans granted by the International Monetary Fund have
become the principal financial instruments. These changes in the dominant
financial instruments went together with a marked reduction in the number of
actors on the creditors' side, facilitating the formation and institutionalization
of strong creditor cooperation.
Cooperative arrangements were already in place before the current debt
servicing problems occurred on a large scale. These arrangements could sub-
sequently be used as a starting point for fast action. For example, official
lending was confined to the few most developed core countries organized
within the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). With the foundation of the
DAC in 1960, official donors set up a joint forum and established cooperative
decision-making processes in development assistance. Moreover, official do-
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nors and international organizations promoted further cooperation in develop-
ment aid by forming aid consortia, consultative groups, and round tables.
Commercial banks, largely dependent upon each other owing to the system of
interbank credits for their part, provided the large loans which sovereign
borrowers needed jointly in the form of so-called syndicated credits.
Our basic hypothesis concerning the relations between actor structure on
the one hand, and the efficacy of crisis management, degree of creditors'
influence, and extent of debt relief on the other may be developed further by
using the concept of world leadership or hegemonic cycles developed by
Modelski (1978) and Wallerstein (1983). Basically, world leadership cycles
describe the actor structure within the most highly developed core countries
which also represent an important segment within the group of creditors.
World leadership cycles are characterized by the rise and decline of
hegemonic powers within the world-system. Generally, hegemony is based on
productivity advantages due to the early introduction of basic technological,
social, and organizational innovations. However, as such innovations are
adopted by other core countries, the advantages are narrowed and eventually
disappear.2 When a country rises to hegemonic power, the actor and power
structure of the world-system is unicentric and the hegemonic power is capa-
ble of shaping the economic and political order of the world system according
to its interests. With the decline of a hegemonic power, the actor and power
structure within the core becomes multicentric. World leadership cycles also
affect the relationships between core and periphery, that is, between creditor
and debtor countries. Among others, Chase-Dunn (1989:273) argues that the
hegemony of a single core country leads to a more multilaterally structured
core-periphery relationship and a relaxation of political forms of core control
over the periphery. Conversely, core countries tend to tighten their bilateral
relations with peripheries and to resort to political forms of control when the
world-system becomes structured in a multicentric fashion. The nineteenth
and twentieth centuries were dominated by two hegemonic powers: During
the nineteenth century, British supremacy prevailed, whereas between the
turn of the century and World War II the power structure became multicentric.
During the postwar period the United States first gained the hegemonic posi-
tion which, however, has begun to deteriorate from the 1970s onwards.
From the above reasoning one may draw the following sub-hypotheses
concerning the pattern of debt settlements. First, one may argue that debt
crises are more quickly negotiated during hegemonic phases, when the world
system is economically and politically dominated by a single world power
which is interested in the maintenance of financial stability and may act as a
2
 In addition to the economic forces emphasized by Wallerstein (1983) and Chase-Dunn
(1989), political and military processes are also relevant (see, among others, Modelsky 1978 and
Kennedy 1987).
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kind of an international lender of last resort. Second, the economic and
political influence exerted on debtor countries by creditors is expected to be
more pronounced when the power structure becomes multicentric due to the
rising competition among core countries. Third, the terms of debt settlements
may be more favorable for debtor countries in phases of uncontended
hegemony because the hegemonic power, unlike competing core countries,
disposes of the necessary financial resources. Conversely, the existence of
several leading powers improves the bargaining position of individual debtor
countries at the periphery. Therefore, the situation most favorable for debtors
is during the transition phase from an old and decaying hegemonic power
(which is, however, still one of the most important creditor countries) to a new
and rising world leading power trying to integrate debtor countries at the
periphery into its own and newly emerging power system at the expense of the
old hegemonic power. In addition, one may expect differences in the settle-
ment pattern between different hegemonic powers, as between Britain and the
United States. Thus, Lipson's (1985, 1989) comparison of security policies
concerning foreign capital between Victorian Britain and postwar America
suggests more interventionist policies during the hegemony of the United
States.
According to our discussion of the structural differences between the three
debt crises of the late 1820s, the mid-1870s and the early 1930s on the one
hand and the current debt-servicing problems of sovereign borrowers on the
other, we first deal with the settlement of defaults on foreign governmental
bonds prevalent prior to World War II. Thus, the next section provides a
comparison of debt settlements concluded in connection with the three earlier
crises concerning the four dimensions elaborated above (actor structure and
institutional framework, efficacy of crises management, degree of creditors'
influence and extent of debt relief). Section II subsequently analyzes the
settlement of debt-servicing incapacities during the post-war period, that is the
pattern of multilateral reschedulings of official and private credits. Section III
summarizes the differences between the settlement of defaulted foreign bonds
and multilateral reschedulings. Finally, section IV discusses the various debt
proposals initiated during the past decade in the light of the historical experi-
ence and draws some conclusions regarding the prospects for future debt
settlement strategies.
I. THE SETTLEMENT OF DEFAULTS ON FOREIGN GOVERNMENTAL
BONDS: DEBT CRISIS MANAGEMENT PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II
Before World War II the negotiation and settlement of defaults on governmen-
tal bonds was rather weakly institutionalized, especially so during the first
three quarters of the nineteenth century. With their unilateral suspension of
interest or amortization payments, defaulting countries violated the provisions
of the loan agreements. A debt settlement thus implied a formal renegotiation
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of this contract between the debtor country and its bondholders. Such arrange-
ments, however, were rather difficult to realize, as the negotiation process was
complicated by the dispersion of creditors within a large mass of small
bondholders.
During the nineteenth century, bondholders were only badly organized.
When default occurred, bondholders tried to establish committees in order to
protect their interests and to enter into negotiations with representatives of the
defaulting country. The mere formation of such ad hoc committees was,
however, rather time-consuming. Moreover, these committees usually had
only limited competence. Thus they could not conclude binding agreements
with the respective debtor country. Rather, the arrangements concluded by the
committees had to be approved by a general meeting of the bondholders
concerned. But even if the majority of bondholders accepted the arrangement,
it was not binding on the individual bondholders. In addition, the committees
lacked the necessary financial resources, infrastructure, and access to infor-
mation on the economic and political situation of the respective debtor coun-
try. The rivalry between several competing committees often further weak-
ened the bargaining power of bondholders' representatives.3
As a reaction to these problems of creditor coordination and cooperation,
permanent central national bodies were established in most important creditor
countries from the late nineteenth century onwards. The first and most impor-
tant of these national protective committees emerged in Great Britain, when
the Council of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders was formed in 1868.
Similar bodies were established in other creditor countries, such as France and
Belgium (1898), Switzerland (1912), Germany (1927) and the United States
(CFB 1933; see Winkler 1933:153-78; Borchardt 1951:214; Eichengreen and
Portes 1989:15-25). These central councils established committees to protect
bondholders' interests when a default occurred, nominating the members of
the committee and usually organizing a general meeting of bondholders to
ratify their appointments. Permanent committees were established for coun-
tries with a bad debt record. The national bodies supported the committees
with infrastructure (e.g., offices, secretary services), financial resources (e.g.,
travel expenses) and technical advice. The committees entered into negotia-
tions with the defaulting country and worked out an agreement with the
respective debtor country for a settlement of defaulted debts. The national
council then recommended that the bondholders accept this agreement, which
was, however, as noted above, not binding for the individual bondholders.
Two further forms of debt adjustment can be discerned in addition to the
negotiation of such formal agreements between bondholders' committees and
defaulting countries. First, in the case of temporary suspensions or defaults on
3
 In the wake of the Portuguese default of 1892, for example, three different bondholders'
committees were established in France alone (Union des Porteurs Francais de Rentes Portugaises
1893:21).
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amortization payments alone, bondholders' claims were in general simply met
by a repayment of arrears. Second, existing obligations were sometimes con-
verted into new debts by a concerted action of creditors before the debtor
country was forced into open default. Yet such consolidations, which are
rather similar to the multilateral rescheduling technique of the post-war peri-
od, could be realized in only four cases.4
We now turn to a closer inspection of the pattern of debt settlements
concerning defaulted foreign governmental bonds. From 1820 to 1975 some
120 debt settlements were concluded between bondholders' committees and
debtor countries.5 These settlements mainly relate to defaults on interest
payments or on both interest and amortization payments; amortization pay-
ments alone were adjusted in only five cases. The principal sources for the
following empirical analysis are the annual reports of the British Council of
Foreign Bondholders from 1873 to 1985, which contain a detailed record of
the negotiation processes and the terms of the settlements agreed upon be-
tween bondholders and debtor countries. In addition, the annual reports of the
French and Belgian bondholders' associations and the weekly issues of The
Economist (from 1843 until 1939) were used (see Association Frangaise,
Association Beige, Corporation of Foreign Bondholders [CFB]).6
As outlined in the preceding section, the pattern of debt settlement is
examined for the efficacy of the crisis management, the degree of economic
and political control exercised by creditors over debtor countries, and the
degree of debt relief granted by creditors. These three dimensions, which are
supposed to be closely associated with the actor structure and the strength of
cooperative arrangements among creditors, will be analyzed separately for the
settlement of each of the three major debt crises. As demonstrated by the
empirical material presented by Marichal (1989) for Latin America and by
Suter (1989:26) for the whole world economy, the three crises culminated in
1828-40, in 1876-81, and in 1932-45.7 Debt settlements were usually
reached several years after the outbreak of debt crises. Thus, peak years in the
number of debt settlements concluded were the 1840s, the 1890s and the
decade after World War II. For the following empirical analysis the three
periods of default settlements defined are delimited by the trough years of the
three principal debt crises. The number of sovereign borrowers in default was
4
 These instances are Colombia (1873), Serbia (1895), Morocco (1903-04), and Liberia
(1912); a consolidation was reached in the case of the Argentine debt crisis of 1890 a few months
after the suspension (Suter 1990: Appendix A).
5
 This figure relates to final agreements only. Temporary arrangements and agreements which
did not become effective have been excluded.
6
 The annual reports of the British bondholders are hereafter referred to as CFB. For a more
detailed description of the data set and the sources, see Suter (1990).
7
 Several Latin American debtor countries also experienced serious debt servicing difficulties
in the wake of the Baring crisis during the early 1890s (see Fishlow 1989 and Marichal 1989:149-
70 for the Argentine case). Another small debt crisis occurred during World War I and affected
debtors like Bulgaria, Liberia, Mexico, the Ottoman Empire and Russia (Suter 1990:283).
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lowest in 1871 (five countries) and in 1926-27 (three countries) while the
number of reschedulings started to rise from 1975-76 onwards (see Suter
1990:306-10). Hence, the first default settlement period covers 1821-70; the
second, 1871-1925; and the third, 1926-75.
In general, each of the three periods defined above begins with a wave of
defaults characterizing the outbreak of a global debt crisis (late 1820s,
mid-1870s, early 1930s) and comes to an end when all defaults have been
settled by arrangements between the defaulting countries and bondholders'
representatives. This conception presupposes that the default-settlement se-
quences of the three principal debt crises are not overlapping: that each default
is settled before the next principal debt crisis emerges. Yet, as mentioned
above, five sovereign borrowers which had suspended payments in the wake
of the first global debt crisis were still in default when the crisis of the
mid-1870s broke out. Similarly, three defaulting countries of the second de-
fault-settlement period reached a debt settlement only after the outbreak of the
crisis of the 1930s. Because we are interested in comparing the settlement
strategies of the three principal periods of debt crises, these eight cases cannot
be classified clearly into one of the three default-settlement periods and could
thus distort the pure configuration of the crisis-specific settlement patterns.
Thus, they have been excluded in the following empirical examination.
Efficacy of Crisis Management
The efficacy of managing a debt crisis involves two related aspects: the
capability to take action and to respond quickly to a looming crisis on the one
hand and the durability of the crisis solution on the other. Consequently,
efficient strategies of the crisis management are characterized by a quickly
reached and long-lasting debt settlement. As a measure for the quickness of
the crisis management, the duration of defaults, such as the time span between
the outbreak of debt service incapacities and the final conclusion of the debt
settlement arrangement, has been computed. The figures presented in Table 1
for 114 debt settlements for which data are available show an average duration
of defaults on foreign bonds of nine years, that is, an average of nine years
passed after default before debtor countries reached a final settlement with
their creditors (see Table I).8 Our empirical evidence suggests that bond
defaults were not at all rapidly followed by settlements as claimed by
Jorgensen and Sachs (1989:49) and that the efficacy of crisis management was
rather poor. This has to be attributed to the bondholders' low level of institu-
tionalization. As discussed above, merely organizing the bondholders was
rather time-consuming. Even after the permanent national protective councils
were established, the bondholders' committees lacked the competence to ar-
8
 The average default duration rises to ten years when those eight cases which were not
classified into one of the three default-settlement periods are included in the calculation.
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TABLE 1
Average Yearly Duration of Defaults on Foreign Governmental Bonds
and Durability of Debt Settlements"
Duration of Defaults Durability of Settlements
Default-Settlement Period (in Years) (in Years)
1. 1821-1870
2. 1871-1925
3. 1926-1975
Total: 1821-1975 9.2(114) 21.4(104)
"The number of cases is indicated in parentheses.
SOURCES: Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (Annual Reports 1873-1985); Pfister and Suter
(1986); Suter (1990).
range binding agreements with debtor countries, making the negotiation pro-
cess difficult and lengthy. Thus, one has to conclude that the gradual institu-
tionalization of bondholders' interests into permanent protective councils had
little impact on the efficacy of crisis management.
In addition, there are some differences between the individual default-
settlement periods. Thus, the duration of defaults was highest during the
period 1821-70 (fourteen years)9 and lowest in 1871-1925 (six years). A
one-way analysis of variance with the duration of defaults and the settlement
period as the dependent and independent classification variables, respectively,
shows substantial differences in group means of settlement periods.10 In order
to compute the contrasts between individual group means, Scheffe's test has
been computed. It shows significant differences only between the periods
1821-70 and 1871-1925." Because the variance within groups is rather
high,12 the differences between the three default-settlement periods should be
interpreted with caution. Moreover, one has to take into account that our data
cover only defaults that were eventually settled. Nevertheless, the following
comments which can be derived from the hypotheses discussed in the intro-
ductory section should be made.
First, the extremely long duration of defaults during the first settlement
9
 This figure is somewhat lower than Marichal's estimation of fifteen to thirty years for the
duration of defaults by Latin American countries during this period (1989:60). These differences
may be attributed to the more prompt settlement negotiated by the non-Latin American defaulting
countries (for example, Spain or the United States, which also were the most important debtors of
those days) indicating the greater relevance of the European periphery and the United States for
the international financial system of the early nineteenth century.
10
 /-"-value for one-way analysis of variance is 6.4 (level of significance is .01).
11
 Scheffe's test is the most conservative test for a posteriori contrasts.
12
 The model explains only 10 percent of total variance.
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period (1821-70) may be attributed to the lack of permanent bondholder
committees. Furthermore, most debtor countries in default during the debt
crisis of the late 1820s suffered from heavy political instability and a weak
state apparatus with a narrow financial resource base. This holds especially
for Greece and several Latin American debtor countries which had just be-
come independent.
Second, the comparatively quick settlement of defaulted bonds during the
period 1871-1925 is more difficult to explain. One may argue, first, that in
contrast to the deep and protracted crisis of the 1930s, the depression of the
world economy during the 1870s was quickly overcome. The rapid expansion
of the world economy during the 1880s and the first decade of the twentieth
century may have accelerated the settlement processes considerably. A second
line of reasoning refers to the concept of world leadership cycles. As ex-
pected, the defaults occurring in the wake of the debt crisis of the mid-1870s,
when Britain had an uncontested financial supremacy, were more quickly
settled than the defaults of the 1930s, when different powers in the core of the
world system were contending for supremacy.13
Third, the argument that core rivalry can explain the relatively long dura-
tion of defaults in the wake of the crisis of the 1930s should be elaborated
further: It may be expected that the rivalry between the two military super-
powers, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR), and their political allies that emerged after World War II and cul-
minated in the Cold War delayed the debt settlement process in cases of
debtor and creditor countries not belonging to the same political alliance. In
fact, most Communist governments repudiated the foreign bonds raised by
their predecessors from Western core countries. During the 1950s and 1960s
four Communist countries (Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia)
eventually concluded a debt settlement with creditors. The average duration of
these defaults amounted to twenty-one years, more than twice the average of
the default-settlement period 1926-75. Moreover, five Communist countries
(Bulgaria, China, German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, USSR)
were still in default by 1975.
The duration of defaults is, however, only one aspect of the crisis manage-
ment. Another important dimension of the efficiency of the debt crisis man-
agement refers, of course, to the quality of the solution, which in a broad
sense may be defined as the durability of a debt settlement. Due to the
quantitative nature of our data the measurement of this aspect can only be
approximate. The time period between the conclusion of the debt settlement
and the outbreak of the next debt service incapacities (default or rescheduling)
13
 Similarly, Kindleberger (1973, 1978) explains the severeness of the crisis in the 1930s with
the lack of a hegemonic power that felt responsible for the stability of the international financial
system. He argues that Britain was not able to act as a lender of last resort and the United States
were not willing to do so.
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has been calculated as the indicator of the durability of the crisis management.
As shown in Table 1, the average durability of debt settlements for 104 cases
is twenty-one years.14 Thus, on the average, after a debt settlement, twenty-
one years elapse before the same country defaults once again or negotiates a
rescheduling arrangement. Between the three default-settlement periods there
are no substantial differences in the durability of the crisis management. This
substantiates the relevance of the differences in the duration of defaults. Thus,
one may conclude that the crisis management during the period 1871-1925
was most efficient, as the durability of debt settlements was similar but
average default duration substantially lower than during the periods 1821-70
and 1926-1975.
Creditor Pressure on Debtor Countries
Insolvent debtor countries sometimes came under political and economic
control of their creditors. The most frequent form of political and economic
control was the establishment of debt administration councils and the control
of public finance of debtor countries by creditors' representatives. Debtor
countries usually had to cede to these councils some financial revenues used to
finance interest and amortization payments, such as the state monopolies,
taxes and customs duties. In most cases, the council itself collected the
revenues assigned. The degree of the creditors' influence on these debt admin-
istration councils varied according to the composition of the council. In the
case of Serbia (1895), for instance, the council was dominated by representa-
tives of the debtor government, and the influence of bondholders was rather
weak (Born 1986). Conversely, the debt administration of Liberia (1912) was
largely controlled by creditors and was vested with far-reaching financial
competence. Thus, the creditors directly supervised tax and duty collection
and reorganized Liberian public finance. As a consequence, the Liberian
government completely lost its financial autonomy (Radke and Sauer 1980).
Between 1821 and 1975 creditors used political and economic intervention
through the formation of debt administration councils in only nine cases—the
equivalent to 8 percent of all debt settlements. Most of these cases (seven out
of nine) fall into the settlement period 1871 — 1925.15
In addition to the establishment of debt administration councils by bond-
holders and creditor countries, creditor countries in two instances also used
14
 Ten cases which did not encounter any debt service difficulties after concluding a debt
settlement were excluded from calculation.
15
 The following debtor countries were subject of the establishment of debt administration
councils: Tunisia (1869-70, joint debt administration), Egypt (1876, British-French debt admin-
istration), the Ottoman Empire (1881, debt administration by Britain, Holland, France, Italy, and
Austria-Hungary), Serbia (1895, joint debt administration), Greece (1898, international debt
administration by Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Russia), Morocco
(1903-04, customs administration by France), the Dominican Republic (1904-08 and 1931
customs administration by the United States), and Liberia (1912, debt administration under the
direction of the United States with Britain, France, and Germany; see also CFB, Annual Reports).
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open military intervention against defaulting debtors which refused to pay
their debt service obligations. In one case France invaded Mexico, against the
republican regime of Benito Juarez, with the initial support of Spain and
Britain. In 1863 France installed the Austrian archduke, Maximilian, a broth-
er of the Austrian emperor, Franz Joseph, as emperor of Mexico. In the
second case, Germany, England, and Italy jointly blockaded Venezuelan ports
in 1902-03 because the Venezuelan government under Cipriano Castro did
not resume debt service payments after the termination of the civil war.
Venezuela also refused to pay any indemnities for war damages to foreign
property. After the French intervention against Mexico proved rather unsuc-
cessful,16 the claims of the European powers were largely met in the settle-
ment with Venezuela (see Lipson 1989:202-4; Suter 1990:Appendix A). This
pattern of very limited political control exerted by creditor countries is in
accordance with Lipson's conclusions (1989), from his case studies of the
Ottoman Empire, Greece, and Venezuela and his analysis of British diplo-
macy during the nineteenth century, that the British government exerted little
influence on foreign debtors and only rarely used interventionist policies to
secure private bondholders' interests.
Apart from such political pressures, debt settlements sometimes also in-
cluded elements of exclusive economic control. Thus, in nine debt arrange-
ments, debtor countries ceded property rights to creditors. In most cases either
land or railways were assigned to bondholders in return for a partial liquida-
tion of existing debts. A telling example is the Peruvian debt settlement of
1889, which became known as the Grace contract. In this arrangement out-
standing debts of some $30 million and arrears of interest of $23 million were
cancelled in return for the assignment of the state railways for sixty-six years,
two million tons of guano, and the concession for the operation of steamboats
on Titicaca Lake (CFB, Annual Reports 1877-89). Other debtor countries
ceding some property rights to bondholders were Colombia (1861 and 1873,
land), Costa Rica (1885, railways), the Dominican Republic (1893, railways),
Ecuador (1885, land; 1897-98, railways), El Salvador (1899, railways), and
Paraguay (1855, land; cf. CFB Annual Reports 1873-1900/1901; Suter
1990:Appendix A). This record shows that seven out of nine cases occurred
during the settlement period 1871-1925. Our results demonstrate that purely
economic control by creditors is as important as the better known political
one. Surprisingly, most studies on creditors' intervention in the wake of bond
default only rarely discuss economic control (see Lipson 1985, 1989; Mar-
ichal 1989).
One may say in summary that the creditors' political and economic control
over debtor countries was rare: It can be demonstrated for only 20 out of 113
16
 Maximilian was dethroned and executed in 1867 and the Mexican government never paid
back the so-called Maximilian debts of some £20 million (see also Agarawal 1989:143-5).
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debt settlements. Yet, most of these cases (15 of the 20) occurred during the
settlement period 1871-1925. Four fall into the period 1821-70 and only one
into the period 1926-1975.l7 This pattern suggests that political and eco-
nomic pressures by bondholders and creditor countries can be interpreted
against the background of the rising rivalry among core countries towards the
end of the nineteenth century and the resulting imperialist policies pursued by
the European powers and the United States. Political and economic control in
the context of debt settlements were part of this strategy. This is demonstrated
by the cases of Tunisia, Egypt, and the Dominican Republic, which were
integrated into the colonial and quasicolonial empires of their principal cred-
itor countries in the wake of payment difficulties.
Degree of Debt Relief Granted by Creditors
Three dimensions of debt relief have been selected for examination: reduction
in arrears of interest, such as the capitalization or conversion rate of arrears of
interest into new debts; reduction of interest rates; and reduction in the face
value of outstanding foreign bonds.18 First, because defaults lasted more than
nine years on the average, settling the arrears in interest is the most important
dimension of debt relief. Thus, by the time a settlement was finally reached,
these arrears in interest often exceeded the face value of defaulted bonds.
Usually, the arrears in interest were converted into new bonds at a certain
discount, and the interest rates of these new debts were considerably lower
than those of the original bonds. Only in the case of the forced Mexican debt
settlement of 1864 were the arrears converted at a substantial premium for
bondholders.19
Table 2 shows the average conversion rate of arrears in interest for the fifty-
four debt settlements for which data are available. From 1821 to 1975 the
arrears were converted at a rate of 67 percent into new bonds. Hence, bond-
holders wrote off an average 33 percent of arrears, and real debt relief was
even higher, as compound interest was not considered. During the three
default-settlement periods the conversion rate fell continuously from 81 to 35
17
 See also Lindert (1989:237) and Eichengreen and Portes (1989:18-20) for an account of
government pressures by creditor countries following the crisis of the 1930s.
18
 A fourth dimension of debt relief which cannot be analyzed due to the lack of data refers to
the reduction in amortization rates. Yet, because amortization rates of foreign bonds usually are
rather low, they are only of secondary importance concerning the degree of debt relief. A further
dimension on which systematic data are also lacking are direct buy-backs on capital markets by
debtors. Jorgensen and Sachs (1989) estimated the amount of such buy-backs by Latin American
defaulters at 5 to 30 percent of total debts during the crisis of the 1930s.
19
 This debt settlement was concluded after France installed Austrian archduke Maximilian as
the emperor of Mexico. The arrangement included the conversion of arrears of interest of £2.9
million into new debts of £4.9 million. In addition, France supported the regime with a new 6
percent bond of £12.4 million, of which Maximilian had to pay £4 million to the French
government as indemnification for the French military expedition (CFB 1877:59, 1930:260;
Wynne \95\:21ff.; Bazant 1968:93#. ).
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TABLE 2
Average Degree of Debt Release Granted by Creditors"
Settlement
Period
1. 1821-1870
2. 1871-1925
3. 1926-1975
Total: 1821-1975
Capitalization
Rate of Arrears
(Percentage)11
80.7 (18)
71.6(24)
35.2 (12)
66.5 (54)
Reduction in
Interest Rates
(Percentage)'
15.4 (17)
16.3 (36)
34.5 (26)
22.1 (79)
Reduction in
Outstanding
Debts
(Percentage)*1
2.6 (20)
22.8 (38)
23.2 (23)
17.9 (81)
"This is based on the capitalization rate of arrears, the percentage reduction in interest rates and in
outstanding debts, with the number of the agreements in the parentheses.
*The capitalization rate of arrears reflects the average conversion rate of accumulated arrears of
interest into new bonds.
'The reduction in interest rates reflects the average reduction in new interest rates as a percentage
of the original rates of interest.
rfThe reduction in outstanding debts is the average percentage reduction in the face value of
outstanding bonds.
SOURCES: Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (Annual Reports 1873-1985); Suter (1990:238-
82).
percent. Thus, in the wake of the debt crisis of the 1930s roughly two-thirds of
arrears were cancelled.20
Second, the settlement of defaulted debt also included a renegotiation of
interest rates. We have been able to compute the average reduction of interest
rates as a percentage of the original rates for seventy-nine debt settlements. As
shown in Table 2, interest rates were lowered by 22 percent on the average. If
one also takes into account the considerable reduction in interest rates on
converted arrears, the interest reductions were even more substantial. The
reduction of interest rates, relatively modest during the periods of 1821-70
and 1871-1925, became more substantial from 1926 to 1975.21 Third, debtor
countries and bondholders' representatives converted defaulted bonds into
new debts in most settlements. As a result of such conversions the amount of
2 0
 In order to test the significance of the differences concerning group means of settlement
periods, a one-way analysis of variance with the conversion rate of arrears as dependent variable
and the settlement period as independent variable has been carried out. Differences with regard to
the group means of default-settlement periods attain a level of significance of .05 (F-value =
5.0). Scheffe's test shows significant differences at the .05 level between the periods 1821-70 and
1871-1925 on the one hand and 1926-75 on the other.
2 1
 In a one-way analysis of variance these differences between default-settlement periods
attain a level of significance of .001 (/•'-value = 8.0). Scheffe's test shows significant contrasts at
the .01 level between the periods 1821-70 and 1871-1925 on the one hand and the period 1926-
75 on the other.
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outstanding debt was newly fixed. Table 2 presents the average percentage
reduction in the face value of foreign bonds for the eighty-one settlements for
which data are available. On the average, outstanding debts were lowered by
18 percent. Although the face value of foreign bonds remained virtually
unchanged during the settlement period 1821-70, it was lowered substantially
in 1871-1925 and 1926-75.22
The comparatively high degree of debt release during the settlement period
1871-1925 has to be attributed partly to debt liquidations that the creditors
granted in return for political and economic control. As discussed above,
several debtor countries ceded land and railways to bondholders in exchange
for debt release. If the settlements containing any form of political and eco-
nomic control are excluded from calculation, reduction of outstanding debts
decreases to 12 percent for the period 1871-1925, but the figures remain
virtually unchanged for the periods 1821-70 (2 percent) and 1926-75 (24
percent). Despite these elements of political and economic control, creditors
granted considerably more debt relief in the wake of the debt crisis of the
1870s than during the first half of the century. In this respect, Marichal's
(1989:125) conclusion that defaulting Latin American countries of the 1870s
were often forced to pay exorbitant prices for their debt settlements has to be
qualified.
When all three dimensions of debt relief are considered together, a trend
towards more favorable terms for debtor countries may thus be discerned. The
degree of debt relief was lowest during the settlement period 1821-70 and
highest during the period 1926-1975. As discussed above, the higher degree
of debt relief during the period 1871-1925, compared to the period 1821-70,
may be attributed partly to debt liquidations as a result of rising political and
economic control of debtor countries by creditors. The comparatively high
degree of debt relief during the settlement period 1926-75 may be explained
by the dynamic of world leadership cycles, as hypothesized in the introducto-
ry section of this essay. Thus, the settlement of defaults after the crisis of the
1930s coincided with the transition of hegemony from Britain to the United
States. This situation was rather favorable for debtor countries, as they were
mainly indebted to the old and decaying hegemonic power (that is, Britain).
The United States as the new world leader did not support British interests but
rather tried to integrate debtor countries at the periphery into its own
hegemonic power system by granting substantial concessions at the expense
of Britain.
To sum up, the pattern of debt settlement with respect to defaulted foreign
governmental bonds and its change in the course of the three settlement
periods may be characterized as follows. During the first settlement period
22
 In a one-way analysis of variance these differences between default-settlement periods
attain a level of significance of .05 (F-value = 3.4). Yet Scheffe's test shows no significant
differences at the .05 level between individual default-settlement periods.
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(1821-70), foreign bonds remained in default for a relatively long period. The
terms of debt settlements were comparatively unfavorable for debtor coun-
tries, but the creditors made only a few attempts to control debtor countries
politically and economically. During the second settlement period (1871 —
1925), debt settlements were concluded comparatively quickly. The arrange-
ments also contained some elements of debt release, especially with respect to
reductions in the nominal value of outstanding bonds. However, debtor coun-
tries often had to pay for the liquidation of foreign bonds with a loss of their
political and economic autonomy. Compared to the period 1871-1925, the
efficacy of the crisis management declined somewhat during the third settle-
ment period (1926-75), although the terms of the settlements were extremely
favorable for debtor countries. Furthermore, substantial debt relief was not
tied to political and economic control of debtor countries by their creditors.
II. MULTILATERAL DEBT RESCHEDULING DURING
THE POST-WAR ERA
After World War II, multilateral debt rescheduling became the single most
important strategy to cope with debt crises. Rescheduling quite simply refers
to the process of renegotiating the terms—particularly interest rates, matu-
rities and grace periods—of a part of the credits falling due during a pre-
viously fixed time period (the consolidation period) or of credits already in
arrears. In contrast to the strategies discussed above, multilateral reschedul-
ings are usually applied before debtors have formally defaulted on their debts.
By negotiating debt rescheduling agreements, creditors and debtors are able to
maintain the impression of orderly financial relations. Thus, rescheduling has
the significant advantage of preventing debt problems from becoming uncon-
trollable crises.
There are, however, some serious limitations to the rescheduling approach,
some of which are discussed later in this section. Before this, we present a
brief outline of the institutional features of debt rescheduling. Subsequently,
we describe the development of rescheduling activity since World War II and
then pass on to an analysis of data concerning the three dimensions of the
efficacy of crisis management, political and economic influence on debtors,
and the extent of debt relief provided by rescheduling operations. As in the
previous section our empirical analysis aims at covering all the cases of
rescheduling.23
The multilateral nature of the institutional framework of rescheduling must
be qualified. Due to the segmentation of financing activities during the post-
23
 The data used have been gathered from official sources (IMF, World Bank, OECD) as well
as international financial press releases (Financial Times, Neue Zuercher Zeiiung, Euromoney,
Institutional Investor). They are fully discussed and evaluated in the appendices to Pfister and
Suter (1986) and Stamm (1987). Unless otherwise indicated, all quantitative data presented in this
section are taken from those two sources.
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war era—which is visible in the division of commercial, concessional (devel-
opment), and trade finance among different actors of the financial system—it
has not been possible to create a truly multilateral framework which includes
all the creditors and borrowers simultaneously. Instead, individual debtors are
confronted with specialized so-called creditor clubs of banks and official
lenders, such as the development and trade financing agencies of core coun-
tries. Small private suppliers, on the other hand, have generally not been able
to create similar frameworks and thus have remained largely dependent on the
goodwill of debtors (International Monetary Fund, hereafter IMF, 1985:34—
39). Yet the establishment of the rescheduling mechanism has greatly profited
from the structure of present-day international financial relations. Because the
specialized creditor groups are quite homogeneous, comparatively small, and
have a dense interaction structure which exposes some cooperative features
even without debt problems, creditor cooperation has been easier to imple-
ment than during earlier crises (see introductory section).
In addition, multilateral development and financial institutions, such as the
World Bank, the regional development banks and the International Monetary
Fund, have not yet directly participated in debt reschedulings but have secured
preferential treatment for themselves by stressing the special nature of their
credits. They, however, have played a crucial role in promoting cooperation
between creditors and debtors and maintaining debtor discipline by, for exam-
ple, binding debt rescheduling agreements to the previous conclusion of
standby agreements with the IMF. In addition, cofinancing arrangements with
the World Bank and the occasional provision of bridging finance by central
banks and the Bank for International Settlements have further enhanced coop-
eration and with this have strengthened the system's stability. Thus, the re-
scheduling strategy characterized by a complex field of interaction includes
international financial institutions as the supervisors and strongly organized
creditor clubs confronting debtors individually as the executors.
As illustrated below, creditor clubs usually only provide debtors with very
limited debt relief on a case-by-case basis. Underlying this strategy has been
the belief that it is important to keep borrowers on a short leash (Lipson
1981:622) to restore the capacity to make payments quickly—an assessment
widely promoted by the Bretton Woods institutions. Consequently many debt-
ors with chronic debt problems have had to undergo several reschedulings
during the past years. In addition, different creditor groups were afraid of
being played off against each other by debtors. Because official and private
creditor clubs have never succeeded at establishing direct cooperation, a cli-
mate of mutual distrust often resulted in protracted negotiations. The difficul-
ties of cooperation within creditor clubs at a lower structural level have also
contributed to this outcome. Because those problems have been discussed
elsewhere in some detail, we will only provide a very short overview here (see
Suter et al. 1990).
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For official creditor clubs, most problems in creditor cooperation stem from
the political and ideological differences of participating governments. Still, in
most instances it was possible to implement a strategic consensus among
creditors who usually not only have to cooperate in creditor clubs but also
other international institutions, including the DAC and OECD. Most notable
is the Paris Club, whose operations account for the bulk of the rescheduling
agreements with official creditors of the past decade. Despite some conflicts
about the best possible debt relief strategy and about some individual debtors,
the Paris Club has generally been able to rally its members in relatively short
time to interpret reschedulings as extraordinary short-term measures that
should not be confused with development efforts (Cizauskas 1979:202; IMF
1981:22, 1985:20-25). This observation does not apply to all the other clubs
of official creditors in operation during the post-war era. Political disputes on
the treatment of Poland and Cuba for example, as well as their lack of
membership in the IMF have delayed agreements for several months or even
years in those cases.24 Still other official creditor clubs operating mainly
during the 1970s have provided more far-reaching rescheduling operations for
either very poor or very important debtors by also considering developmental
needs.25
Cooperation problems have been more accentuated among commercial
banks. As there has often been a large number of banks involved (up to
1,000), so-called steering or advisory committees of about ten to twenty of the
most important banks (usually the syndication leaders) were formed. The
preliminary agreements negotiated by these committees often included, at the
insistence of official creditors and the Bretton Woods institutions, the renewal
of credits or even the provision of new money; and thus many banks found
themselves in conflict with their principle of not throwing good money after
bad. In addition, smaller and less exposed banks often speculated on being
able to get out of their credit contracts at the cost of bigger institutes. Conse-
quently, their resistance against signing debt relief agreements was consider-
able and could not always be broken by the more cooperative banks (IMF
1986:12; Padoan 1986:101/, 131/.). Thus, we find organizational problems
somewhat similar to those faced by individual bondholders during earlier
crises.
Still, commercial banks have also concluded a large number of reschedul-
ing agreements during the past decade involving far larger amounts than the
official renegotiations. Overall, the 226 rescheduling agreements concluded
involved 52 countries and covered credits worth roughly $275 billion between
2 4
 Somewhat the same applies to the reschedulings of Ghana (1966-74) and Yugoslavia (1983
onwards).
2 5
 This was the case in the recurrent debt reschedulings with India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan
(largely during the 1970s) that took place within an aid consortium chaired by the World Bank.
Strategic considerations applied to the reschedulings of Turkish debt by a group of OECD
creditors (1978-80).
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1956, when the first multilateral rescheduling agreement with Argentina was
signed, and 1986. Ninety agreements worth $204 billion were negotiated by
private creditors,26 as were ninety-nine worth $39 billion by the Paris Club
and thirty-seven worth $32 billion by other groups of official creditors. Not
surprisingly, only a minor proportion of agreements (56) was concluded be-
fore 1980 largely between official creditors (46) and involving some chronic
problem borrowers (India, Argentina, Chile, Indonesia). In addition, seven of
the ten bank reschedulings before 1980 were concluded in 1978 and 1979.
Yet, despite its importance, multilateral debt rescheduling is presently not
the only form of crisis management. As noted in section I, the process of
settlement of defaulted pre-war external debt has yet to be fully concluded
and, in addition, some countries have repudiated their debts from the post-war
era.27 Other countries with debt problems have undergone bilateral debt re-
schedulings, and some others received only short-term temporary deferments
of debt repayments.28
THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF DEBT CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Let us now turn to a short discussion of the three dimensions of crisis manage-
ment that have already been analyzed in the last section concerning the pattern
of debt settlement prior to World War II.
Efficacy of the Crisis Management
Rescheduling as a means of settling debt problems undoubtedly seems very
efficient, in terms of the time span for settlement from the onset of debt
problems, at least at first sight. As noted above, reschedulings have usually
been negotiated before formal debt suspensions by debtors occurred. Based on
the discussion of the features of creditor clubs above, one would expect
official creditors to be more efficient in concluding rescheduling agreements
than private creditors. In fact, one unwritten principle of the Paris Club
expects creditors and borrowers to conclude an agreement in principle within
only two days of negotiations in Paris. This seems to have worked quite well
in the past, but these meetings were usually preceded by an extensive phase of
consultations involving creditor and debtor governments and the IMF.
26
 One was negotiated with private suppliers (Nigeria 1984).
27
 China 1949, Czechoslovakia 1959, Cuba 1963, Rhodesia 1965, North Korea 1974 (Suter
1990:Appendix A; Cline 1984:90).
28
 Bilateral agreements have been concluded with Uruguay (1965), Egypt (1966), Yugoslavia
(1965, 1971), Philippines (1970), Vietnam (1985), and Chile (on several occasions since 1985)
(see Bittermann 1973:108-203; Dhonte 1975:183; Financial Times March 12, 1985; Stamm
1987), whereas temporary deferments were accorded to Zaire, Bolivia, Guyana during the late
1970s and early 1980s (Stamm 1987:173). Note also that temporary deferments are usually
agreed upon as a first emergency measure when a debtor runs into debt servicing problems. Those
deferments are replaced by a formal rescheduling agreement. Thus, the renewal of deferments
indicates that problems in negotiations caused a delay in, or the failure of, rescheduling efforts.
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Still, the hypothesis that official creditors were more efficient is also sup-
ported by data on the duration of renegotiations from the onset of debt prob-
lems (coded as the application of a debtor for a debt relief operation) and the
conclusion of agreements. Although there are only data for forty-five agree-
ments, the average duration can be tentatively estimated at about one year,
with higher average values for private banks and lower ones for official
lenders. However, this finding is bound to be misleading and not only for
reasons of the small data base. For example, data on the conclusion of the
bilateral agreements of Paris Club creditors are lacking, and consequently, an
additional time span of several months between the negotiation of agreements
in principle and their actual implementation must be added in some instances.
Even more important, reschedulings usually are not debt settlements in the
true sense of the word but rather provisional solutions involving short-term
delays of repayments. Many debtor countries had to conclude a series of
reschedulings and even renew their older agreements repeatedly because they
were unable to restore their solvency in the short time-frame provided by the
creditors. More precisely, between 1976 and 1986 a total of forty-eight coun-
tries had to reschedule their external debt, but thirty-eight of them met more
than once with their creditors. The median value for this period is three
agreements per country, with the lead taken by Sudan with ten agreements,
followed by Poland and Zaire (nine each) and Cuba and Madagascar (eight
each). From this perspective, most of the debt settlements of the present crisis
have been pending for several years. Thus, the speed of intervention must not
be confounded with the very doubtful durability of the settlements reached.
Creditors' Pressure on Debtor Countries
Apart from some largely failed attempts, creditors have not exerted direct
political or economic influence.29 Instead, they delegated this task to interna-
tional financial institutions, particularly the IMF, whose adjustment programs
indirectly reflect the preferences of the principal (official) creditors who are
also the most influential members of the IMF. Consequently, the IMF has
been identified as one of the central places of formulation of creditor interests
and supports them further by coordinating creditor club actions and providing
statistical materials on debtors. Thus, creditors have heavily relied on the
IMF's operations and not surprisingly 77 percent of all reschedulings con-
cluded until the end of 1986 were accompanied by IMF adjustment programs.
The remaining agreements were concluded either with non-members of the
IMF or countries that took an explicitly conflictive stance towards this organi-
zation. In both instances, the negotiations have on average been more
29
 Those attempts include the failure of private banks to implement an economic adjustment
program in Peru (for 1970s, see Cline 1981), the fruitless installation of an external financial
supervisor in Zaire (for 1978, see Koerner el at. 1984:134-44) as well as the economic sanctions
of creditors against Poland in the early 1980s (Stamm 1987:Appendix).
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protracted and the terms negotiated have tended to be harder. Despite the
absence of direct and open influence by creditors, we thus find a great deal of
indirect pressure exerted through international institutions that play an impor-
tant role as policemen in the financial system (see Aronson 1985:141; Kahler
1986:265; and also Eichengreen and Portes 1989; Lipson 1989).
The Degree of Debt Relief Granted by Creditors
Because each debt settlement strategy has a different nature, we have to use
somewhat different indicators than those employed in the previous section.
This renders direct comparisons difficult. For example, interest arrears have
seldom been rescheduled. Therefore, we are not able to construct a compara-
ble indicator covering their capitalization (see Table 2). Somewhat the same
applies to the previously used data on the reduction in outstanding debt, as it
has tended to be renewed rather than reduced significantly during the post-war
era. Yet, as in the previous section, we investigate the behaviour of interest
rates and the extent of debt relief provided by reschedulings. The consolida-
tion periods and the new maturities and grace periods are especially il-
lustrative in this respect, and the actual amounts rescheduled, as well as the
percentage of those amounts in relation to the total amount coming due during
the consolidation period, give further useful indications as to the amount of
debt relief and are thus provided.
All these data are presented in Table 3, grouped according to type of
creditor and time of conclusion of the rescheduling agreement. The first
column covers the precritical period before 1983, which is characterized by
sporadic debt renegotiations with comparatively few chronic problem bor-
rowers. The next two columns exhibit the data from the actual crisis. It was
convenient to distinguish between the two-year periods in these two middle
columns on the grounds that with the persistence of the crisis, debt reschedul-
ing terms have been adjusted to the long-term nature of the crisis. For reasons
of simplicity, we have omitted the data for official creditor clubs other than the
Paris Club.
A clear general picture emerges from Table 3. Average amounts renegoti-
ated have continually grown and the terms accorded to debtors have generally
been very hard. Consolidation, grace periods, and maturities were relatively
short, and on average 3 to over 15 percent of the rescheduled debt had to be
paid as scheduled or as a down payment.30 Unfortunately, there are no data on
the interest rates agreed upon by official creditors, but they seem to have been
on a commercial basis as were the banks' interest rates (Hardy 1982:25f.;
Lindert 1989:239-44). During the two years immediately following the onset
of the debt crisis, banks negotiated higher rates than the original interest (2
30
 Normally, only principal was renegotiated. Interest payments have only been capitalized on
few occasions (Nicaragua 1980-85).
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TABLE 3
Average Terms of Reschedulings with the Paris Club
and Commercial Banks, 1956-1986"
Amount''
Paris Club
Banks
Share-
Paris Club
Banks
Consolidation
Period/
Paris Club
Banks
Maturity*
Paris Club
Banks
Grace'1
Paris Club
Banks
Interest'
Banks
I956-82h
266 (37)
633 (22)
83.6 (28)
93.2 (22)
23.1 (37)
17.6(16)
9.9 (36)
6.5 (22)
3.8 (29)
3.1 (20)
1.65(21)
1983-84
412(27)
1,642 (34)
91.6(16)
97.0 (32)
13.5 (26)
20.9 (29)
9.9 (23)
7.1 (34)
4.7(16)
3.0 (32)
1.94(33)
1985-86
532 (33)
4,782 (27)
91.4(21)
97.1 (14)
20.1 (34)
38.5 (26)
9.8 (24)
9.6 (22)
4.8 (24)
3.6(21)
1.47 (22)
1956-86'
397 (97)
2,404 (83)
88.1 (65)
95.8 (68)
19.5 (97)
26.6(71)
9.9 (83)
7.6 (78)
4.3 (69)
3.2 (73)
1.73(76)
"The numbers in the parentheses indicate the number of cases used in the calculations.
*The time period of banks begins only in 1978, so the three agreements concluded before that
year are omitted in these calculations.
<The omission described in note b also affects the figures in this column.
rfThe amount is in millions of dollars.
'The share is the percentage share of rescheduled credits in proportion to the total amount falling
due.
/The consolidation period is in terms of months.
"Maturity indicates the time after which the whole principal must be paid back and includes the
grace period.
''This is the grace period, or the time in which only interest payments are due.
'The interest category refers to the interest rate and is indicated as a percentage over the London
Interbank Offered Rate. There are no data on the interest rates accorded by official creditors.
SOURCES: Pfister and Suter (1986:Appendix); Stamm (1987:Appendix).
percent over the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) on average) and on
several occasions exacted so-called rescheduling fees of around 1 percent of
the total amount renegotiated. In sum, reschedulings have largely been con-
cluded on commercial terms involving only small long-term debt relief.
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Several qualifications are in order. Most indicators have improved signifi-
cantly during the 1985-86 period, and this trend has continued during the
following years. The Paris Club, for its part, has recently deviated from its
standard practice of providing debtors with consolidation periods of only one
year, maturities of ten years, and grace periods of five years. Although this
rule still applies to the larger debtors, poor debtors have often been provided
with twenty-five-year maturities and ten-year grace periods; and in some
instances consolidation periods of several years were included in the same
agreement. In addition, some creditors have unilaterally converted some of
their loans into grants on special occasions (IMF 1988:12).
This trend towards better terms for debtors has even been more pronounced
for commercial banks. As can be seen from Table 3, during the 1985-86
period interest rates dropped by almost half a percent (from an average of 1.94
percent to 1.47 percent over LIBOR) and consolidation periods have almost
doubled to an average of more than three years (38.5 months). At the same
time, maturities have on average lengthened by 2.5 years and grace periods,
too, improved, although by a lesser amount of only about half a year. From
1987 onwards this trend was consolidated. Interest rates have dropped to an
average of under 1 percent over LIBOR, rescheduling fees have been left
totally aside, and the other terms have also improved again. In addition, a
large proportion of agreements also included the provision of new money and
the maintenance of short-term credit.
To sum up, the rescheduling strategy can be characterized as follows. First,
the settlement of debt problems is quick but rather provisional. Second,
creditors do not exert any direct influence on debtors, but indirect, largely
economic, pressure is applied by international organizations, notably the IMF.
Third, there has not been debt forgiveness on a large scale.
III. EXPLAINING THE PATTERN OF DEBT SETTLEMENT
In the two previous sections we have described the patterns of debt settlements
of defaulted foreign bonds predominant prior to World War II on the one hand
and multilateral reschedulings of external debt in the post-war era on the
other. Our empirical analysis has revealed marked differences between these
two debt settlement regimes with respect to the efficacy of the crisis manage-
ment, the degree of debt relief, and the degree of political and economic
pressures exerted on debtor countries by creditors.
The first and most obvious difference refers to the efficacy of the debt
settlement. In the case of multilateral reschedulings, crisis management is
able to respond much more quickly. Although agreements between bond-
holders and debtor countries concerning the settlement of defaulted bonds
could be reached only after six to fourteen years, multilateral reschedulings
were generally concluded within just one year. Conversely, the durability of
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debt settlements is considerably higher in the case of default settlements. The
fact that debt reschedulings usually provide only provisional settlements hints
at the existence of a trade-off between speed of intervention and durability of
solutions.
Second, debtor countries obtained much more favorable terms for debt
settlements for defaulted foreign bonds than for multilateral reschedulings.
Several empirical studies dealing with the interwar period already showed that
the settlement of the crisis of the 1930s brought debtor countries substantial
debt relief (Eichengreen and Portes 1989; Jorgensen and Sachs 1989). Our
findings demonstrate that this argument can be generalized to all settlements
of bond default during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Moreover, the
quantitative nature of our indicators allows us to make a more precise assess-
ment of real debt relief. Thus, our empirical analysis suggests that on the
average the settlement of defaulted foreign bonds comprised a reduction of
outstanding debts (including arrears of interest) of about 30 percent. As much
as an estimated 50 percent of outstanding debts (including arrears of interest)
was liquidated through the debt settlements in the crisis of the 1930s. In
addition, interest rates on these reduced debts were lowered by more than one-
third. This substantial debt release is in marked contrast with the hitherto hard
terms of rescheduling agreements during the first years of the debt crisis of the
1980s.
Third, one may conclude that creditors exerted open political and economic
pressures on debtor countries in only a few cases involving settlements of
defaulted foreign bonds. By contrast, creditors exerted substantial but indirect
economic pressure in multilateral reschedulings due to IMF adjustment pro-
grams imposed on debtor countries. Our empirical analysis has shown that the
majority of reschedulings has been tied to such adjustment programs (see also
Eichengreen and Lindert 1989). Basically, this finding is in accordance with
Lipson's (1989) hypothesis of more interventionist policies during the United
States' hegemony than during British supremacy. Yet, Lipson deals only with
political pressures and sets aside the more important economic control exerted
by creditors.
These three regularities are closely associated. Thus, the quick and efficient
intervention of creditors, together with their capacity to exert pressures on
debtor countries to carry out adjustment programs, prevented any substantial
debt relief in the present debt crisis. In accordance with our basic hypothesis
from the introductory section of this article, these three regularities resulted
from the increasing institutionalization of creditors' cooperation during the
post-war era, which was made possible by the marked concentration of inter-
national lending amongst relatively few actors.
Our analysis of the actor structure and the institutional framework of the
debt settlement processes prior to World War II has clearly shown the low
degree of creditor cooperation. The large number of dispersed individual
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bondholders made organizing these creditors virtually impossible. Conse-
quently, they were neither capable of responding quickly to adverse develop-
ments nor of protecting their interests against borrowers. This explains the
low efficacy of debt management, the favorable terms of settlements for
debtor countries, and the failure of creditors to enforce political and economic
control upon debtors.
After World War II the actor structure on the creditors' side substantially
changed: Nation-states, international organizations, and large bank syndicates
began to prevail instead of individual bondholders. This process implied a
substantial reduction in the number of actors, allowing for a dense interaction
structure. From this starting point, it was comparatively easy to organize
creditor interests in the instances of debt problems and, as those problems
grew in number, to institutionalize such creditor clubs as the Paris Club which
had clearly defined structures and aims. Yet the particular features of official
and private lending resulted in differences in the organization and efficacy of
different creditor clubs. The comparative strength of the official creditor clubs
was partly due to the fact that the principal official lenders are also the most
important decision-making units in the international organizations, mainly the
IMF. These organizations could readily be used as promoters and supervisors
of debt and adjustment strategies. Thus, the institutionalization of creditor
clubs involved an effective linkage of debt management and economic influ-
ence on adjustment. The political and social consequence of these austerity
policies is the massive and unprecedented protest by social movements in
debtor countries (see Walton and Ragin 1990).
In addition to this basic change in the debt settlement regime from defaults
to rescheduling, three further, though less important, differences in the crisis
management of the three earlier settlement periods (1821-70, 1871-1925,
and 1926-75) have been demonstrated which have not yet been discussed in
the literature. First, the efficacy of debt settlements was highest during the
period 1871-1925. Second, economic and political control of debtor coun-
tries by creditors was most pronounced during the period 1871-1925. Third,
there is a trend towards a higher degree of debt relief, with the most favorable
terms granted to debtors during the settlement period 1926-75. These dif-
ferences are in general consistent with our sub-hypotheses drawn from the
concept of world leadership cycles. Although this concept is yet somewhat
vague and requires more theoretical specification (see Lipson 1989 for an
alternative explanation), our empirical analysis suggests its relevance for the
explanation of differences in the patterns of debt settlement. This may also be
demonstrated with respect to two aspects of the present debt crisis manage-
ment. First, the change within the actor structure on the creditors' side, which
we regard as the basic prerequisite for the institutionalization of creditor
clubs, occurred when the United States shaped the new economic and political
world order during and after World War II. Thus, the World Bank, the IMF,
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and the OECD were all established under the leadership of the United States
and initially served as important organizational pillars of the hegemony of the
United States, becoming the institutional core of rising creditor cooperation
during the post-war era. Second, the provisional nature of the current re-
scheduling approach, together with the unfavorable terms for debtors, may
well be related to the decline of United States hegemony since the 1970s.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD: PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE DEBT
SETTLEMENTS
Our analysis shows that, compared to the settlement of defaulted foreign
governmental bonds, the present settlement strategy of multilateral reschedul-
ing is much more efficient because it is faster in intervening, although it
mainly deals with short-term symptoms on a provisional basis. This raises the
question about the future of the rescheduling strategy and the prospects for a
long-term solution of the present crisis. In this final section the different debt
proposals suggesting ways out of the present debt crisis are discussed in the
light of the historical experiences from settlements of earlier debt crises.
During the 1980s numerous plans and debt proposals were made. For
instance Bergsten et al. (1985) alone discuss twenty-four specific alternatives
for private bank debts. Although there was a surge of innovative new schemes
in the very beginning of the debt crisis, the realized rescheduling approach
was generally considered as more or less successful and the discussion of
more far-reaching solutions became less lively towards the mid-1980s.31 It is
indicative of the state of the debt crisis management in the final years of that
decade that the debt proposal discussion revived a focus on more long-term
solutions (see Bird 1987; Pastor 1987; Feinberg and Ffrench-Davis 1988;
Dornbusch 1989; Griffith-Jones 1989; O'Neill 1989; and the Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspective 1990). We do not intend to give a detailed overview on the
various debt proposals here. Rather, the following discussion will be confined
to the four basic schemes to which most debt proposals may be attributed
(compare Suter et al. 1988:38). These ideal-typical scenarios may be charac-
terized as the scenarios of debt repudiation, debt release, debt repayment, and
debt increase.
First, debt repudiation aims at reducing debt burden by liquidating a sub-
stantial part of indebtedness. Debt repudiations are declared unilaterally by
debtor countries without the creditor's consent and thus represent a violation
of contractual obligations. As discussed in detail in the previous sections, debt
repudiation was the usual strategy before World War II. Debt repudiation,
which has hitherto always been made by individual borrowing countries sepa-
31
 This may be illustrated by the rhetorical question, "Debt: Are We at the End of the Crisis?"
raised by Michel Camdessus (1986), managing director of the IMF and former chair of the Paris
Club.
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rately, can also be declared jointly by the most heavily indebted countries
coordinating their policies in a debtor's cartel (see Kaletsky 1985; Hojman
1987; Holler 1989).
Second, like debt repudiation, debt release intends to reduce a substantial
part of outstanding debt. Yet, contrary to debt repudiation, this reduction is
achieved by the joint actions of debtors and creditors. Debt release implies
that commercial banks allow substantial write-offs for losses and that the
governments of the creditor countries absorb these losses. One of the most
paradigmatic versions of this scenario has been advanced by the German
economist, Wilhelm Hankel (1984:90-93). Debtor countries and their politi-
cal leaders of course support debt release. Fidel Castro (1985), for instance,
proposed that creditor countries could liquidate outstanding debts by reducing
military expenditures by 12 percent. Elements of debt release are also in-
cluded in the debt discounting proposals suggested by prominent bankers and
economists, who recommend that banks transfer frozen assets to existing or
newly established international organizations (see Kenen 1983, 1990; Sachs
1990).
Third, under debt repayment, debtors have to meet their obligations in full.
This means that the debtor countries have to earn foreign exchange by produc-
ing export surpluses either by increasing exports or by reducing imports. An
alternative way for debtor countries to earn foreign exchange is to sell parts of
their property (such as state-owned companies) to foreigners. The conse-
quences of such schemes are privatization and denationalization of debtors'
economies.
The fourth scenario, debt increase, is based on a global Keynesian model.
Advocates of this proposal, like the Brandt Commission (1980, 1983), recom-
mend a massive increase of financial flows to developing countries to free
frozen assets and overcome economic recession. As in the case of debt release
this proposal intends to strengthen international financial institutions. The
required financial resources may be raised by increasing real transfers from
developed countries (such as increasing official aid, taxing international trade
or arms production) or by creating international liquidity (such as increasing
the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) of the IMF). Insofar as the latter strategy
is carried out, this scheme may be called debt inflationing.
Debt settlement patterns of the earlier debt crises contained elements of all
four of these ideal-typical scenarios. Thus, an unilateral suspension of debt
service payments at least for some years was common practice, although a
permanent debt repudiation rarely happened. Our empirical material has
shown that the bondholder's representatives granted partial debt release during
all the debt crises before World War II. Debt repayment, of course, also
occurred, among others in the form of cession of property rights to creditors.
However, compared to the other three scenarios, there were—apart from the
capitalization of arrears of interest payments—only a few instances of debt
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increase before World War II. Obviously, it proved rather difficult to convince
individual bondholders to invest fresh money in the virtually insolvent debtor
countries.32
Although historical evidence for all of the four ideal-typical scenarios may
be found, the models actually realized in the wake of the past debt crises
always were a combination of them. Specifically, one may discern a certain
temporal sequence in the occurrence of the four basic scenarios. Thus, during
the initial stages of an impending debt crisis, debtor countries usually tried to
mobilize new loans on capital markets (debt increase). If this proved impossi-
ble, they were forced to take some adjustment measures (debt repayment) or
to suspend debt service payments (debt repudiation). The settlements
eventually negotiated between debtor countries and creditors after a period of
default usually contained some debt relief, such as reductions in interest rates
or outstanding debts (debt release) and elements of debt repayment.
The above reasoning suggests that the question about the prospect of future
debt settlements is not a matter of pure debt repayment, debt increase, debt
repudiation, or debt release but rather of combining elements from different
basic scenarios. As discussed in detail in the previous sections, the strategy of
multilateral rescheduling applied to the present debt crisis differs substantially
from the settlement pattern of past crises. In terms of the four basic scenarios,
the rescheduling approach may be characterized as a combination of debt
repayment (partly postponed to the future) and debt increase (as far as new
credits were extended and interest payments were capitalized)—a model that
was very exceptional before World War II. Moreover, our analysis of develop-
ments within the rescheduling culture since the onset of the present debt crisis
suggests changes in the combination and importance of the different basic
scenarios. Thus, during the first two years, elements of debt repayment clear-
ly prevailed. The Baker Plan proposed in 1985 recommended strengthening
international institutions, massively expanding the disbursements of new
credits by the World Bank (an increase of 50 percent for 1986-88) and by
private banks ($20 billion for fifteen heavily indebted countries for three
years), and shifting the structural adjustment processes of debtor countries
from debt repayment to debt increase. Yet, in reality the Baker Plan never
became effective because the private banks completely failed to mobilize the
required amount of fresh money (see Pastor 1987).
During the second half of the 1980s new debt relief techniques were imple-
32
 One of these few instances was the consolidation of the Moroccan external debt in 1904 by a
consortium of French banks. This transaction was, however, strongly supported by the French
foreign ministry in order to secure French control on the Moroccan state against the interests of
other imperial powers (see Guillen 1972). Another prominent case of debt increase was the
Argentine debt settlement after the crisis of 1890. As a result of a series of debt conversions and
capitalization of interest payments, foreign debt of the Argentine government rose from 204
billion gold pesos to 389 billion (Marichal 1989:159-66).
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mented, indicating a gradual shift from the combination of debt repayment
and debt increase to debt repayment and debt release. Three measures of
techniques of debt release have been of special importance. First, a secondary
market of third world debt evolved where debts were traded at discounts
ranging from 20 to 90 percent. Second, several rescheduling agreements
included the possibility of debt-to-equity swaps. In such swap transactions
investors buy debt at a discount from the banks and receive the countervalue
of the credits as investment capital or shares in existing local firms in the
debtor countries (see Parhizgari 1988). The recently initiated debt for nature
swaps refer to the same basic idea: A conservation organization acquires debt
titles at a certain discount, converts them into local currency, and then uses the
proceeds to finance conservation programs in the country concerned (Hansen
1989). Third, official creditors at the Toronto summit of the seven major
industrial countries in 1988 decided to grant debt relief to the heavily indebted
low-income countries, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa. The recom-
mended techniques included concessional interest rates, longer repayment
periods, and partial write-offs of debt service obligations.
The Brady Plan adopted in 1989 extended this debt reduction strategy to the
heavily indebted middle-income countries on the one hand and to international
private banks on the other (see Frenkel 1989). It represents, therefore, a
further and more decisive step towards the scenario of debt release. Under the
Brady Plan, private creditors can choose among three options: reducing out-
standing debt or in interest rates, or granting new loans. As in the case of
the Baker Plan the Bretton Woods institutions are to play an important role
in the new debt strategy by financing or guaranteeing debt reduction (see IMF
1989; Sachs 1989). The Mexican rescheduling of early 1990, which served as
a test case of the Brady Plan, illustrates, however, the as yet limited nature
of this debt release. This agreement, which covered external debts of $48
billion owed to some 500 private banks, brought the Mexican government a
reduction of $1.7 billion in interest payments (corresponding to 10 percent
of the total debt service due) and a reduction of $6.7 billion in outstanding
debts (amounting to 7 percent of total outstanding debt). Only 10 percent
of all the banks involved agreed to offer new loans, indicating, thereby,
their lack of support for the scenario using debt increase. Compared to the
settlements of defaulted foreign governmental bonds, in which 40 percent
of arrears of interest were cancelled and outstanding debts and interest rates
were reduced by an average of about 20 percent, the degree of debt release
granted to Mexico by the Brady Plan rescheduling has to be judged as rather
low.
In sum, the developments in the strategies for debt settlement during the
past decade show a shift away from pure debt repayment. In the middle of the
1980s, an attempt to combine debt repayment and debt increase largely failed,
facilitating, thereby, a movement towards the scenario of debt release at the
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end of the decade. Yet historical evidence suggests that the elements of debt
release have to be considerably strengthened in future, particularly if the
feasibility of debt increase further deteriorates.
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